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INTRODUCTION
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed life in
America in many ways. Long lines at the airport, heavily armed
police on the streets of major cities, and constant news of the "War on
Terror" became pervasive parts of American life. But not all agree
with the measures taken since September 11 to prevent another
terrorist attack. From preemptive war' to warrantless domestic
wiretaps,2 several of the Bush administration's decisions during the
War on Terror have inspired strong opposition. The designation of
individuals detained during Operation Enduring Freedom-and to a
lesser extent Operation Iraqi Freedom-as enemy combatants rather
1. See Peter Baker, Bush To Restate Terror Strategy; 2002 Doctrine of Preemptive
War To Be Reaffirmed, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2006, at Al (describing the Bush
administration's preemptive war policy).
2. See Adam Liptak, In Limelight at Wiretap Hearing: 2 Laws, But Which Should
Rule?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2006, at Al (discussing congressional hearings on the Bush
administration's decision to conduct wiretaps on certain international telephone calls to or
from suspected al Qaeda members without court authorization).
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than prisoners of war ("POWs") has occupied the attention of the
American public and its courts in the years following September 11.
The Bush administration argues that the Geneva Conventions
support the enemy combatant designation.4  Administration
opponents contend that there is no valid legal support for the
administration's enemy combatant designations,5 and argue that the
detained individuals should instead be treated as POWs pursuant to
the Geneva Conventions, which would guarantee them far more
privileges and rights than those afforded to enemy combatants.6
An argument against the enemy combatant designation that has
not received as much attention is the claim that the administration's
use of the enemy combatant designation will jeopardize the status of
members of the U.S. Armed Forces.7 The argument is that enemies
of the United States could potentially use the justifications for the
enemy combatant designation against captured U.S. service members
in the future.8 U.S. special operations forces, whose missions usually
3. See, e.g., Charles Lane, Debate Crystallizes on War, Rights, WASH. POST, Sept. 2,
2002, at Al (stating that debate over the enemy combatant designation and other
initiatives of the Bush administration is increasing); Neil A. Lewis, In Rising Numbers,
Lawyers Head for Guantanamo Bay, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2005, at A10 (discussing the
surge of lawyers volunteering to represent Guantanamo Bay detainees); see also Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006) (holding that the military commissions conducted
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, violated the principles of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537 (2004) (holding that due process
requires a U.S. citizen held as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to
contest the factual basis of his detention); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (holding
that the federal habeas statute confers on district courts jurisdiction to hear challenges of
aliens held at Guantanamo Bay).
4. See infra Part III. The Department of Defense defines an enemy combatant as
"an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners."
Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to Gordon England, Sec'y of
the Navy 1 (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/
policy/dod/d2004O7O7review.pdf.
5. See generally George C. Harris, Terrorism, War and Justice: The Concept of the
Unlawful Enemy Combatant, 26 LOY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 31 (2003) (arguing that
the Government should not abandon the basic principles of the U.S. criminal justice
system to gather intelligence from terrorism suspects); Srividhya Ragavan & Michael S.
Mireles, Jr., The Status of Detainees from the Iraq and Afghanistan Conflicts, 2005 UTAH
L. REV. 619 (arguing that the Geneva Conventions warrant the application of POW status
to al Qaeda and Taliban detainees).
6. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing the various rights to
which POWs are entitled to).
7. See Ragavan & Mireles, supra note 5, at 623.
8. See id. at 623, 675. The White House press corps raised this same concern during
the press secretary's announcement of the President's policy toward al Qaeda and Taliban
detainees. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, White House Press
Secretary Announcement of President Bush's Determination re Legal Status of Taliban
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include unconventional tactics and uniforms,9 could be particularly
vulnerable. This Comment analyzes the Bush administration's
decision to classify al Qaeda and Taliban detainees as enemy
combatants, focusing on the legal justifications for the decision. It
argues that the administration's rationale for classifying the detainees
as enemy combatants will not place U.S. Armed Forces in justifiable
legal jeopardy in future armed conflicts, as the Geneva Conventions
simply do not support an argument that U.S. forces can be designated
as enemy combatants and held indefinitely.
In Part I, this Comment discusses the origins and nature of the
War on Terror, specifically the events of September 11 and its
aftermath, focusing on al Qaeda's and the Taliban's behavior as
fighting forces and the Taliban's status as the purported government
of Afghanistan. This Part also discusses the detainee issue and the
Bush administration's approach to the problem. Part II discusses the
applicable international and domestic law addressing the detainee
problem, focusing on the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War ("GPW"). Part III discusses the Bush
administration's justifications for the enemy combatant designation.
Part IV discusses the legal implications of these justifications on U.S.
conventional forces and special operations forces. This Part argues
that the classification of detainees as enemy combatants, rather than
POWs, should have no legal effect on the classification of U.S. forces
in the future, but that the current policy may give forces capturing
U.S. service members a propaganda argument for such an action.
This Comment concludes by recommending measures that may
mitigate any residual threat to U.S. forces from current
administration policy.
and al Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/s/U/38727.htm
(Question to Mr. Ari Fleischer: "But the concern, the debate here was about if you don't
do it here, then U.S. soldiers could be mistreated abroad. Isn't that correct?").
9. See DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT PUBL'N 1-02; DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY
OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 499-500 (Dep't of Def. ed. 2006), available at
http://www.dtic.miUdoctrine/jel/new-pubs/jpl02.pdf (describing the mission and methods
of special operations elements); W. Hays Parks, Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard
Uniforms, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 493, 496-98 (2003) (noting special operations forces use of
unconventional uniforms); Militaryphotos.net, Special Forces-Afghanistan,
http://media.militaryphotos.net/photos/Special-Forces-Afghanistan (last visited Dec. 11,




I. THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF THE WAR ON TERROR
A. The War on Terror
Although there was some awareness of al Qaeda's activities
before September 11, 2001,10 the events of that day instantly made
this organization the preeminent problem and threat facing America.
Terrorist attacks heavily damaged the Pentagon, destroyed the twin
towers of New York's World Trade Center, ground the U.S. economy
and air traffic to a halt, and killed almost 3,000 people.1 The U.S.
Government immediately responded to these attacks by demanding
that the Taliban turn over all al Qaeda members residing in and
operating out of Afghanistan. 12 Although it did not officially declare
war, Congress enacted a joint resolution authorizing the President to
"use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.""
The international community also rallied to support the United
States. Soon after the attacks, the United Nations Security Council
approved a resolution acknowledging the United States' right to
defend itself. 4 In addition to this resolution, sixty-eight countries
supported U.S. actions in Afghanistan, with twenty eventually
committing troops to the effort. 5
10. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 71-108 (authorized
ed. 2004) [hereinafter THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT] (discussing U.S. efforts to adapt to
the new threats posed by al Qaeda); id. at 108-44 (discussing the Government's response
to al Qaeda's bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa); id. at 190-97 (discussing the
Government's response to al Qaeda's bombing of the U.S. Navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole);
id. at 254-77 (noting that some government officials feared an al Qaeda attack in the
months prior to September 11, 2001).
11. See id. at 4-14, 285-315 (describing the actions aboard the four aircraft hijacked
on September 11, 2001, and the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon);
Eric Lipton, Death Toll Is Near 3,000, but Some Uncertainty over the Count Remains, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at G47 (describing the aftermath of the terrorist attacks).
12. Evan J. Wallach, The Logical Nexus Between the Decision to Deny Application of
the Third Geneva Convention to the Taliban and al Qaeda and the Mistreatment of
Prisoners in Abu Ghraib, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 541, 543-44 (2004).
13. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
14. See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12,2001).
15. See Dep't of Def., Fact Sheet: International Contributions to the War Against
Terrorism (May 22, 2002), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/d20020523cu.pdf
(containing a partial list of the military contributions of more than thirty-five countries).
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Operation Enduring Freedom ("OEF") began on October 7,
2001.16 President Bush stated that OEF's initial objectives included
the destruction of al Qaeda training camps, the capture of its leaders,
and the end of terrorist activities in Afghanistan. 7 Even though the
United States had overwhelming support, both inside and outside the
country, it still faced a significant challenge due to the unconventional
nature of its foe. Al Qaeda is a terrorist organization consisting of
groups operating in several countries and composed of members from
around the world.18 The organization conducts terrorist attacks
against the United States and other Western nations in support of
extremist Islamic political and religious objectives.19 Due to its nature
as a terrorist organization and its illegal activities, al Qaeda is not a
state, is not subject to international law, and has no legal international
status.2 0 As a nonstate, al Qaeda is not a party to the Geneva
Conventions or any other international agreement governing the law
of war.2' The Taliban-the governing party of Afghanistan at the
time-became a target in OEF because it chose to give al Qaeda
members sanctuary rather than expel them from Afghanistan."
Although the Taliban was the operating government of Afghanistan,
16. See GlobalSecurity.org, Operation Enduring Freedom, http://www.global
security.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2006). Early U.S.
military deployments to Afghanistan included several conventional units and numerous
Army, Navy, and Air Force aviation assets operating from adjacent countries and the
Indian Ocean. See GlobalSecurity.org, Operation Enduring Freedom Deployments,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom-deploy.htm (last visited Dec.
11, 2006). In addition to these conventional forces, an undisclosed number of special
operations forces were deployed to Afghanistan, including Army Special Forces teams,
Navy SEALs, and Australian Special Operations soldiers. Id.
17. See Address to a Joint Session of Congress, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140 (Sept. 20, 2001);
Address to the Nation, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1201 (Oct. 7, 2001).
18. See George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal




The Geneva Conventions of 1949 ... make no provision for an international
armed conflict between a state and a transnational criminal network with control
over no territory, a "head of state" who is apparently stateless, a multinational
membership, and operational cells in many states.... The September 11 attacks
did not launch an internal armed conflict in the United States, as understood in
international humanitarian law.
Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on
Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 348 (2002).
22. See Aldrich, supra note 18, at 893.
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the United States and the vast majority of the rest of the world's
countries refused to extend diplomatic recognition to this group.
23
B. The Detainee Problem
As OEF unfolded, the United States and its allies captured a
considerable number of suspected al Qaeda and Taliban members.24
Because these detainees were captured during an international armed
conflict, questions arose regarding their status under international law
and to what protections, if any, they were entitled.25 On February 7,
2002, the White House announced its plan for the disposition of these
detainees.26  The Bush administration determined that the GPW
applied to the conflict between the United States and the Taliban but
not to the conflict between the United States and elements of al
Qaeda.27  The administration further announced that Taliban
personnel would not be entitled to POW status due to the fact that
their behavior on the battlefield was not in accordance with the
requirements of the GPW.28 The result of these decisions was that
neither al Qaeda nor Taliban detainees would be granted POW
status. Regardless of their designation, the administration stated that
all detained al Qaeda and Taliban personnel would be treated
humanely and consistently with the general principles of the Geneva
Conventions. 9 Significantly, Secretary of State Colin Powell argued
23. Id. Most countries instead recognized Burhanuddin Rabbani, the political leader
of the Northern Alliance, who was President of Afghanistan before the Taliban's
takeover, as the official head of state of Afghanistan. See Amy Waldman, Rabbani Holds
Court in Kabul, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2002, at A14.
24. The Department of Defense released a list of 759 individuals detained by the U.S.
Navy at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, from January 2002 through May 2006. See Dep't of
Def., List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, from January 2002 through May 15, 2006 (May 15, 2006), http://www.dod.mil/
pubs/foi/detainees/detaineesFOlAreleasel5May2006.pdf. This total does not include
individuals the United States is detaining outside of Guantanamo Bay or individuals who
were captured and released prior to transfer to the detention center. See id.
25. Aldrich, supra note 18, at 891.
26. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 8.
27. Id.
28. See id. Ari Fleischer, the White House press secretary, announced that
[u]nder Article 4 of the Geneva Convention ... Taliban detainees are not entitled
to POW status . ... Al Qaeda is an international terrorist group and cannot be
considered a state party to the Geneva Convention. Its members, therefore, are
not covered by the Geneva Convention, and are not entitled to POW status under
the treaty.
Id.
29. Id. Mr. Fleischer stated that
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against the decision to deny POW status to al Qaeda and Taliban
detainees, partly on the basis that it might encourage potential
enemies of the United States to find loopholes permitting them to
deny GPW protections to captured U.S. service members."
The decision not to apply the GPW to al Qaeda and Taliban
detainees-and later to foreign insurgents in Iraq-would eventually
lead to numerous problems for the administration. Some have
argued that the administration's decision not to apply the GPW to
these detainees set the stage for abuses against prisoners conducted
by U.S. service members in Afghanistan and Iraq." The decision also
led to legal problems for the White House as the Supreme Court
heard and decided several high-profile cases regarding the rights of
detainees housed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, including Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld,32 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,33 and Rasul v. Bush.34
the United States has treated and will continue to treat all Taliban and al Qaeda
detainees in Guantanamo Bay humanely and consistent with the principles of the
Geneva Convention. They will continue to receive three appropriate meals a day,
excellent medical care, clothing, shelter, showers, and the opportunity to worship.
The International Committee of the Red Cross can visit each detainee privately.
Id.
30. See Memorandum from Colin Powell, Sec'y of State, to Alberto Gonzales,
Counsel to the President 1-2 (Jan. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Powell Memorandum], available
at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4999363/site/newsweek/. The Secretary of State advanced
several justifications for this opinion, including: past U.S. adherence to the GPW; likely
condemnation from allied nations; encouragement of potential enemies to find loopholes
to avoid application of the GPW; discouraging other nations from turning over terrorists;
and undermining a U.S. military culture that emphasizes maintaining the highest standards
of conduct. Id.
31. See, e.g., Wallach, supra note 12, at 541-43, 623-25 (examining how the Bush
administration's decision not to apply the GPW to al Qaeda and Taliban detainees might
have been a catalyst for the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison). Revelations of detainee abuse
at Abu Ghraib prison soiled the U.S. reputation as a protector of civil rights and human
dignity. An official Army investigation identified numerous acts of abuse that shocked the
world. See U.S. ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE
BRIGADE 16 (2004), available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison-abuse-report.pdf
(finding that "between October and December 2003 ... numerous incidents of sadistic,
blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees"). Major General
Antonio M. Taguba, who conducted the Army investigation, documented numerous
instances of abusive behavior, including physical abuse, videotaping and photographing
naked detainees, forcibly arranging naked detainees in sexually explicit positions for
photographs, forcing groups of naked detainees to masturbate while being photographed,
using military working dogs to intimidate detainees (which resulted in at least one severe
dog bite), threatening detainees with a pistol, and sodomy with foreign objects. Id. at 16-
19. Similar allegations of abuse surfaced in Afghanistan. See Tim Golden, Army Faltered
at Investigating Detainee Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2005, at Al.
32. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006) (holding that the military
commissions conducted at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, violated the principles of Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions).
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II. INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENT
A. The Geneva Conventions
A discussion of the classification of those captured on the
battlefield must begin with the Geneva Conventions. The Geneva
Conventions are a series of international treaties designed to ensure
that individuals found or detained on or near a battlefield are
properly classified as combatants or noncombatants and treated
accordingly." The Geneva Conventions grant certain rights and
benefits to specified classes of individuals. Combatant countries must
provide these rights and benefits to all detainees who fall within a
specified class of protected persons.36
The two conventions that are relevant to this discussion are the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War37
and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War ("GCP").38 Article 2 of both the GPW and
GCP ("Common Article 2") governs the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions to an armed conflict.39 It provides that "the present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one
33. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537 (2004) (holding that due process
requires a U.S. citizen held as an enemy combatant be given meaningful opportunity to
contest the factual basis of his detention).
34. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (holding that the federal habeas
statute conferred on district courts jurisdiction to hear challenges of aliens held at
Guantanamo Bay).
35. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, The Geneva Conventions: The Core of
International Humanitarian Law, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/geneva
conventions (last visited Dec. 11, 2006).
36. See id. ("The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are part of
international humanitarian law .... They specifically protect people who do not take part
in the fighting (civilians, medics, chaplains, aid workers) and those who can no longer fight
(wounded, sick and shipwrecked troops, prisoners of war).").
37. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GPW].
38. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. 287,288 [hereinafter GCP].
39. Note that Article 2 is one of several "Common Articles" of the Geneva
Conventions. The Common Articles are found in all four of the Geneva Conventions, and
they generally relate to the scope of application of the Conventions and the obligations of
Convention parties. See INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, U.S. ARMY JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CENTER & SCH., DEP'T OF THE ARMY, LAW OF WAR
WORKSHOP DESKBOOK 27 (Commander Brian J. Bill ed., 2000) [hereinafter LAW OF
WAR DESKBOOK].
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of them."'4 It further provides that even if one of the countries in the
conflict is not a party to the Conventions, those countries that are
parties remain bound to their mutual obligations pursuant to the
Conventions.41 These clauses establish that the United States is
bound by the Geneva Conventions in both Afghanistan and Iraq
because both conflicts are armed conflicts between parties to the
Geneva Conventions.42
If the conflict rises to the level of an "armed conflict," Article 4
of the GPW states the criteria that a capturing party must consider
when determining if a captured person is a POW.43 Although this
may in certain circumstances be a relatively simple determination to
make, the drafters of the Conventions apparently realized that it
might at times be significantly more difficult. Article 5 addresses
these difficult circumstances with a default clause, stating that if "any
doubt arise[s] as to whether persons ... belong to any of the
categories enumerated in Article 4, such person shall enjoy the
protection of the [GPW] until such time as their status has been
determined by a competent tribunal."'  Article 5 essentially
establishes that if there is any doubt, the capturing party should play
it safe.
If a captured person is ultimately determined to be a POW, the
GPW sets forth the rights afforded to the POW. For example, Article
13 provides that POWs must be treated humanely and protected from
acts of violence, intimidation, insults, and public curiosity at all
times.45 Article 17 provides that no physical or mental torture, insults,
threats, disadvantageous treatment, or other forms of coercion can be
inflicted on a POW in an effort to obtain information or intelligence.46
Given the treatment of some detainees in Afghanistan and Iraq,47 this
Article would have been a serious problem if the detainees were
designated as POWs. Many of the other articles essentially indicate
40. GPW, supra note 37, art. 2; GCP, supra note 38, art. 2.
41. GPW, supra note 37, art. 2; GCP, supra note 38, art. 2.
42. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War
Victims of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977, INT'L REV. OF THE
RED CROSS, Mar. 31, 1998, at 178, 178-85, available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/
siteengO.nsf/htmlall/57jp52?opendocument (showing the states that have become parties
to the Geneva Conventions).
43. See GPW, supra note 37, art. 4; infra Parts III-IV (discussing the criteria in detail).
44. GPW, supra note 37, art. 5.
45. See GPW, supra note 37, art. 13.
46. GPW, supra note 37, art. 17.
47. See supra note 31 (discussing mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in
Iraq and alleged detainee mistreatment in Afghanistan).
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that the POW's life should be as comfortable as possible given the
circumstances. 8
Even if the captured individual is determined not to be a POW
under the GPW, the individual is still minimally protected by
Common Article 3 of the Conventions. Common Article 3 provides
that combatants who have surrendered or those who have left the
battle due to sickness, injury, detention, or any other cause should be
treated humanely regardless of their classification.49 Those captured
in Afghanistan and Iraq have been detained,"a and they therefore fall
under the "detention" category of Common Article 3. The provision
specifically states that the following acts are prohibited as to persons
falling into one of the Common Article 3 categories:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.5'
The plain meaning of this Article and the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Hamdan indicate that regardless of the behavior of the
Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, they are, at a minimum, entitled to the
protections of Common Article 3 of the GPW.52
B. Relevant Supreme Court Precedent
In addition to the Geneva Conventions, there are also several
Supreme Court cases that bear on the issue of which captured
48. For example, POWs must be quartered under conditions similar to those of the
service members of the detaining power. See GPW, supra note 37, art. 25. The detaining
power should encourage the POWs to engage in intellectual, educational, and recreational
activities. See GPW, supra note 37, art. 38. Articles 70 and 71 provide that the POW is
entitled to inform his family of his location and correspond regularly with family and
friends. See GPW, supra note 37, art. 70, 71.
49. GPW, supra note 37, art. 3; GCP, supra note 38, art. 3.
50. The Department of Defense defines a "detainee" as "any person captured or
otherwise detained by an armed force." DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT PUBL'N 1-02, supra note 9,
at 159.
51. GPW, supra note 37, art. 3; GCP, supra note 38, art. 3.
52. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006) (holding that Common
Article 3 applies to all armed conflicts).
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individuals qualify as POWs. In Ex parte Quirin,53 the Court heard
the case of eight German troops who sailed to the United States
aboard a submarine during World War II, on a mission to destroy war
industries and facilities within the United States.54 When they landed
on U.S. soil these troops wore German Marine infantry uniforms, but
they removed and buried the uniforms after landing and then
proceeded on in civilian dress to New York City and Jacksonville,
Florida.55  Shortly after their arrival, they were captured and
prosecuted.56 The Germans filed a writ of habeas corpus challenging
their prosecution and asserting that they should be classified as POWs
and treated accordingly.
In ruling on the Germans' petitions for habeas corpus, the
Supreme Court defined the distinction between lawful and unlawful
combatants.58 The Court stated that lawful combatants should be
detained as POWs when captured by the opposing armed force.5 9
Unlawful combatants, on the other hand, "are subject to trial and
punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their
belligerency unlawful."'  The Court included as an unlawful
combatant the "enemy combatant who without uniform comes
secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by
destruction of life or property," and determined that these individuals
''are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of
war, but to be ... subject to trial and punishment by military
tribunals."6 This case is regarded as the origin of the term "enemy
combatant."62
The Quirin opinion is heavily cited in Hamdi and Rasul, two of
the most recent Supreme Court cases regarding the issue of
classification of captured personnel. These cases, when considered
together, establish the most current guidance from the Supreme
Court on the classification and treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban
detainees. The Hamdi Court held that the United States may hold
detainees, including U.S. citizens, captured during OEF pursuant to
53. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
54. See id. at 21.
55. See id.
56. See id.




61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. See Joanna Woolman, The Legal Origins of the Term "Enemy Combatant" Do Not
Support Its Present Day Use, 7 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 145, 147 (2005).
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Congress's Authorization for Use of Military Force.6 3 The Court
wrote that
detention of individuals falling into the limited category we are
considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which
they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident
to war as to be an exercise of the "necessary and appropriate
force" Congress has authorized the President to use.'
As for the length of detention, the Court found that the United States
could detain individuals for the "duration of these hostilities."65
Although the Hamdi Court determined that the United States is
allowed to hold al Qaeda and Taliban detainees as enemy combatants
rather than POWs, Rasul provides these detainees with some degree
of process to challenge their detention. The Rasul opinion establishes
that the U.S. federal courts have jurisdiction to hear detainee
arguments challenging their detention.66 The majority wrote that no
Supreme Court precedent prohibits aliens detained in military
custody outside the United States from bringing suit and asserting
their rights in U.S. courts.67 This victory for the detainees was
relatively short lived. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
("DTA")68 included a provision expressly stripping from the federal
courts habeas jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay detainees.6 9 Section
1005(e) provides that, except as specified by the DTA, "no court,
63. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518, (2004). Yaser Esam Hamdi was an
American citizen who resided in Afghanistan in 2001 when the Northern Alliance seized
and transferred him to U.S. forces. See id. at 510. The U.S. military initially detained Mr.
Hamdi in Afghanistan and then in Guantanamo Bay, but transferred him to a naval base
in the continental United States upon discovering that he was a U.S. citizen. See id. In
2002, Mr. Hamdi's father filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, arguing that, as a U.S. citizen, his son should receive
all the benefits and protections of the Constitution, and complaining that the Government
was holding his son without access to counsel and without any charges filed against him.
See id. at 511.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 521.
66. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483-84 (2004). In Rasul, the Court heard the case
of two Australian citizens and twelve Kuwaitis captured abroad by the United States and
its allies during the conflict with the Taliban and held for two years (at the time the case
was heard by the Court) at Guantanamo Bay. See id. at 470-71. The petitioners filed
several actions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, each
alleging that they had never been combatants against the United States or committed
terrorist acts, and that "none has been charged with any wrongdoing, permitted to consult
with counsel, or provided access to the courts or any other tribunal." Id. at 471-72.
67. Id. at 484. The Court passed on answering the question of which type of
proceedings may be necessary to hear these cases. See id.
68. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739.
69. Seeid. § 1005(e)(1).
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justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider ... a writ
of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the
Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba."7 The Hamdan
Court later limited the applicability of § 1005(e) to only those habeas
petitions not already filed with the courts."
The Hamdan Court also addressed the legality of the military
commission system72 the Government devised for use at Guantanamo
Bay and the procedures to be used by these commissions.73 In its
decision, the Court determined that Common Article 3 of the
Conventions did apply to detainees, therefore giving them the
minimal level of protection offered by the Geneva Conventions, but it
did not address whether the detainees are entitled to the extensive
protections of the GPW.74  Because the Court chose not to address
this issue, the decision to deny POW classification to al Qaeda and
Taliban detainees remains a contested issue.
70. Id.
71. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2762-69 (2006) (holding that
§ 1005(e)(1) does not apply to those habeas petitions already filed at the time of the
DTA's enactment). The Court chose not to address Hamdan's argument that § 1005(e)
unconstitutionally suspends habeas corpus because "[ojrdinary principles of statutory
construction suffice to rebut the Government's theory-at least insofar as this case, which
was pending at the time the DTA was enacted, is concerned." Id. at 2763-64.
72. President Bush established the military commission system to try al Qaeda and
Taliban detainees in a November 13, 2001 military order. Military Order of November 13,
2001-Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,831, 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001). The military order applied to
those individuals the President determined were members of al Qaeda, were involved in
international terrorism, or who harbored any of these individuals. See id. at 57,834. The
President instructed that such individuals be detained by the Department of Defense and
"when tried, be tried by military commission for any and all offenses triable by military
commission that such individual is alleged to have committed, and ... punished in
accordance with the penalties provided under applicable law, including life imprisonment
or death." Id. The President tasked the Secretary of Defense with developing "rules for
the conduct of the proceedings of military commissions, including pretrial, trial, and post
trial procedures, modes of proof, issuance of process, and qualifications of attorneys." Id.
The order specifically provides that the Secretary of Defense did not have to develop
procedural rules consistent with the "principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts." Id. at 57,833.
73. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2772-98 (holding that the military commission structure
is not authorized by the Court's ruling in Quirin or any Congressional act, and that the
Guantanamo Bay detainees must therefore be afforded process consistent with the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions).
74. See id. at 2795 (stating that the Court did not have to address the President's
argument that none of the Geneva Conventions applied because Common Article 3
applies to all armed conflicts).
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III. JUSTIFICATION FOR DENYING POW STATUS TO AL QAEDA AND
TALIBAN DETAINEES
After consulting with his advisers, President Bush decided that
although the Geneva Conventions apply somewhat to the conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq, application of the GPW does not justify
granting POW status to al Qaeda or Taliban detainees. 5 In a
memorandum explaining his decision, the President stated that he
chose to deny POW status to al Qaeda members because al Qaeda is
a nonstate actor and the GPW therefore does not apply to the conflict
between the organization and the United States.76 Regarding the
Taliban, President Bush wrote that although the GPW applies to the
conflict with the Taliban, members of the Taliban themselves do not
qualify as POWs.77 This confusing result stems from the GPW's two-
prong test governing classification of captured combatants.
The U.S. Army Judge Advocate General ("JAG") School
instructs future Army lawyers to evaluate application of the GPW
using the "Right Kind of Conflict/Right Kind of Person" inquiry."
This is essentially a two-prong test for determining a captured
enemy's status. The first prong analyzes the nature of the conflict.79
To pass the first prong of the test, the countries involved must be
parties to the Geneva Conventions engaged in an international armed
conflict.8" Whether a combatant country is a party to the Geneva
Conventions is a relatively simple yes or no determination. However,
the definition of "armed conflict" has caused some disagreement as
commentators and practitioners have debated where exactly the
threshold to armed conflict is passed.8 The JAG School teaches its
75. See Sean D. Murphy, Executive Branch Memoranda on Status and Permissible
Treatment of Detainees, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 820, 822 (2004); supra notes 26-29 and
accompanying text.
76. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Vice President Richard Cheney
et al. 2 (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Bush Memorandum], available at http:l/
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62516-2004Jun22.html ("I note that, because
Geneva does not apply to our conflict with al Qaeda, al Qaeda detainees also do not
qualify as prisoners of war.").
77. See id. ("[Tihe Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not
qualify as prisoners of war .... ").
78. See LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 39, at 73-78; Lt. Col. Paul E. Kantwill
& Maj. Sean Watts, Hostile Protected Persons or "Extra-Conventional Persons:" How
Unlawful Combatants in the War on Terrorism Posed Extraordinary Challenges for
Military Attorneys and Commanders, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 681, 722-31 (2005).
79. See LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 39, at 73-76.
80. Id. at 74.
81. See, e.g., Kantwill & Watts, supra note 78, at 723-24 (stating that some
commentators have argued for a higher threshold on the types of interstate hostilities that
qualify as armed conflicts).
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students to abide by a relatively low threshold.8" It adopts the
definition of the International Committee of the Red Cross
Commentary to the GPW: an armed conflict is any conflict between
two countries "leading to the intervention of members of the armed
forces ... even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of
war. It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, how much
slaughter takes place, or how numerous are the participating
forces. '83  This definition seems to encompass what most would
commonly consider to be a "war" or "armed conflict."
After a conflict meets the requirements of the first prong of the
"Right Kind of Conflict/Right Kind of Person" inquiry, one must
examine the requirements of the second prong. The "Right Kind of
Person" prong requires gathering information about the groups or
individuals in question and determining whether they meet the
criteria specified in Article 4 of the GPW. 4 Article 4 provides four
main categories of persons or groups who are entitled to POW status
if captured during an armed conflict: (1) members of a party's regular
armed forces (including reserve elements);85 (2) members of militias
or other volunteer groups who meet certain conditions; 86 (3) members
of regular armed forces of a government not recognized by the
detaining state;87 and (4) inhabitants of an occupied territory who
take up arms against their occupiers.88
Article 4(A)(2) provides that those in the second group-
members of other militias and volunteer corps, including organized
resistance movements-should be considered POWs if they fulfill the
following four conditions: "(a) that of being commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive
82. See id. at 723-24 ("Currently our instruction to judge advocates retains the lower
threshold ... such that the law of war operates across an extremely broad range of
interstate hostilities."). The JAG Corps LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK lists World War II and
the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf as
definite examples of Article 2 conflicts. See LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 39, at
74. It considers the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo as somewhat questionable examples of
Article 2 conflicts. See id.
83. Kantwill & Watts, supra note 78, at 723 (quoting ICRC COMMENTARY, IV
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME
OF WAR 50 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958)).
84. See LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 39, at 76-78; Kantwill & Watts, supra
note 78, at 724.
85. GPW, supra note 37, art. 4(A)(1).
86. Id. art. 4(A)(2).
87. Id. art. 4(A)(3).
88. Id. art. 4(A)(6) (including as POWs "[ijnhabitants of a non-occupied territory,
who on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading
forces. . . provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war").
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sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; [and]
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war." 9 Note that there is some debate as to whether
these four Article 4(A)(2) criteria also apply to regular armed forces.
As discussed infra, some argue that members of the regular armed
forces qualify for POW status regardless of their adherence to the
Article 4(A)(2) criteria, while others contend that these criteria must
be met by all combatants, including members of "regular armed
forces."9 The weight of authority supports this second interpretation.
Most commentators and the courts agree that the Article 4(A)(2)
criteria apply to regular armed forces, both under Article 4(A)(1) and
4(A)(3), in addition to militias or other volunteer groups.9'
The President's memorandum indicates that the Bush
administration based its decision regarding al Qaeda and Taliban
detainees on this "Right Kind of Conflict/Right Kind of Person" type
of analysis.92 This analysis is articulated in a Department of Justice
memorandum drafted by Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee,
which detailed the arguments that helped form the basis of the
administration's policy.9 3 These are, therefore, the arguments that
future enemies could conceivably use to argue against a POW
classification for captured U.S. service members.
The Bybee memorandum first uses the "Right Kind of Conflict"
prong of the GPW analysis to address the classification of captured al
Qaeda members.94 It states that
[n]on-governmental organizations cannot be parties to any of
the international agreements here governing the laws of war.
Common article 2, which triggers the Geneva Convention
provisions regulating detention conditions and procedures for
trial of POWs, is limited to cases of declared war or armed
conflict "between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties." Al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party. As a
result, the U.S. military's treatment of al Qaeda members is not
89. Id. art. 4(A)(2)(a)-(d).
90. See infra notes 120-30 and accompanying text (discussing and analyzing these
arguments).
91. See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
92. See Bush Memorandum, supra note 76, at 1-2.
93. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't
of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memorandum], available at http://washington
post.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf.
94. See id. at 9.
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governed by the bulk of the Geneva Conventions, specifically
those provisions concerning POWs.
9 5
The memorandum essentially argues that regardless of their activities
on the battlefield, al Qaeda and its members cannot claim the
protections of the GPW because al Qaeda is a nonstate, terrorist
organization.96 As a nonstate, it cannot be a contracting party to the
Geneva Conventions, and therefore does not meet this requirement
of Common Article 2.
97
The memorandum then moves on to the "Right Kind of Person"
prong of the analysis. Mr. Bybee argues that neither al Qaeda nor
Taliban detainees are entitled to the protections of the GPW because
of their conduct on the battlefield. 98  Regarding al Qaeda, the
memorandum argues that even if the GPW did apply to the conflict
with al Qaeda, it would not apply to al Qaeda's members pursuant to
Article 4(A).99 Although al Qaeda personnel could arguably be
considered members of a militia or volunteer corps, they still cannot
qualify for classification as POWs due to their conduct on the
battlefield. Rather than adhering to the four Article 4(A)(2) criteria
governing classification as POWs for members of militias and
volunteer corps, al Qaeda's members
have clearly demonstrated that they will not follow [the] basic
requirements of lawful warfare. They have attacked purely
civilian targets of no military value; they refused to wear
uniform or insignia or carry arms openly, but instead hijacked
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. See GPW, supra note 37, art. 2 (stating that the Conventions apply only to
international armed conflicts between two or more high contracting parties); GCP, supra
note 38, art. 2 (stating the same).
98. See Bybee Memorandum, supra note 93, at 9-11.
99. See id. at 10. As one commentator has written regarding al Qaeda:
A1-Qaeda and aligned factions en masse have chosen to target, terrorize, and
murder civilians unlawfully and deliberately. They have flown hijacked civilian
airliners into two of the world's largest civilian office buildings, kidnapped and
then either shot or decapitated their civilian hostages, attacked and then murdered
noncombatant United Nations peacekeeping forces in Somalia and Afghanistan,
bombed a civilian oil tanker, and bombed the diplomatic embassies and consulates
of numerous countries. They have also bombed, throughout the globe, numerous
synagogues, churches, civilian airports, civilian oil-drilling, pipeline, and storage
tank infrastructure, civilian train stations, civilian residential areas, hotels,
restaurants, office buildings, markets, and nightclubs.
Lt. Col. Joseph P. "Dutch" Bialke, Al Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful Combatant Detainees,




civilian airliners, took hostages, and killed them; and they
themselves do not obey the laws of war concerning the
protection of the lives of civilians or the means of legitimate
combat.100
This passage shows that al Qaeda members would only meet the first
Article 4(A)(2) criteria for classification as a POW, which requires
that the combatant have a defined chain of command.0 1 They would
not meet the other requirements, including displaying a fixed sign
recognizable at a distance, carrying arms openly, and adhering to the
laws and customs of war.0 2
The memorandum's "Right Kind of Person" argument regarding
the Taliban detainees is much more tenuous than the argument
regarding al Qaeda members. Taliban personnel could potentially
qualify as POWs under Article 4(A)(3) of the GPW, which includes
members of regular armed forces of a government not recognized by
the detaining state.0 3 But Mr. Bybee argues that Taliban members
lost their POW status in part because "the Taliban leadership had
become closely intertwined with, if not utterly dependent upon, al
Qaeda. This would have rendered the Taliban more akin to a
terrorist organization that used force ... for terrorist purposes.'' °
Mr. Bybee goes on to state numerous examples of potential Taliban
violations of the Article 4(A)(2)(d) requirement that any combatant
force must conduct its operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.'0 5  These examples include: improper use of
mosques; the placement of artillery pieces close to hospitals, schools,
and residential areas; atrocities committed against prisoners and
civilians; and failure to distinguish between combatants and
noncombatants.0 6 Mr. Bybee concludes that these facts provide the
administration with grounds to suspend application of the GPW's
protections to the Taliban due to the fact that the group refused to
abide by the laws of armed conflict."0 7
This preceding analysis shows that the Bush administration based
its decision to deny POW status to al Qaeda and Taliban detainees on
100. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 93, at 10.
101. See GPW, supra note 37, art. 4(A)(2)(a).
102. Id. art. 4(A)(2)(b)-(d).
103. Id. art. 4(A)(3).
104. See Bybee Memorandum, supra note 93, at 11.
105. GPW, supra note 37, art. 4(A)(2)(d).
106. See Bybee Memorandum, supra note 93, at 20. The memorandum cites to a State
Department report indicating that in August 2000, the Taliban executed POWs in the
streets of Herat. Id.
107. Id.
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its analysis of the GPW provisions. Although the administration's
decision is by no means a universally accepted interpretation of the
Geneva Conventions,"°8 the administration has not revisited, and its
opponents have not successfully challenged, the enemy combatant
designation. The question that remains, therefore, is whether this
reasoning could potentially be used against U.S. forces in the future.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE ENEMY COMBATANT DESIGNATION ON U.S.
FORCES IN THE FUTURE
A. Nature of the Problem
Since the enemy combatant policy was announced,
commentators have discussed the risk of the reasoning behind the
detainee policy being used against U.S. forces in future conflicts.'019
Even members of the Bush administration have debated this
possibility. On January 26, 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell sent
a memorandum to then-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales in
response to Mr. Gonzales's recommendation to classify al Qaeda and
Taliban detainees as enemy combatants. 110 Mr. Powell, a highly
decorated veteran and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,"'
worried that a finding that the GPW did not apply to the detainees
would "reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in
supporting the Geneva conventions and undermine the protections of
the law of war for our troops, both in this specific conflict and in
general.""12 The memo also stated that the decision might provoke
foreign prosecutors into prosecuting U.S. troops and officials."'
Mr. Gonzales's rebuttal to these arguments was less than
encouraging. In a draft memorandum for the President, he wrote that
108. See supra notes 5, 30 (discussing arguments from former Secretary of State Colin
Powell and commentators that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees should be afforded POW
status); see also Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Let Them Be P.O.W.'s, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2002, at A21 (arguing that the enemy combatant designation does not make sense from
both a legal and practical perspective); John Mintz, Debate Continues on Legal Status of
Detainees, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2002, at A15 (discussing the debate between those who
advocate POW status for detainees and the Bush administration).
109. See generally Parks, supra note 9 (arguing that captured U.S. service members are
entitled to POW status regardless of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees' designation as
enemy combatants); Ragavan & Mireles, supra note 5 (arguing that the enemy combatant
policy could endanger captured U.S. service members in future conflicts).
110. See Powell Memorandum, supra note 30, at 1.
111. See Dep't of State, Colin L. Powell Biography, http://www.state.gov/secretary/
former/40385.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2006).
112. See Powell Memorandum, supra note 30, at 1-2.
113. Id. at 3.
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"it should be noted that your policy of providing humane treatment
to enemy detainees gives us the credibility to insist on like treatment
for our soldiers. Moreover, even if GPW is not applicable, we can
still bring war crimes charges against anyone who mistreats U.S.
personnel.""' 4 He further noted that U.S. adversaries in recent
conflicts had violated the requirements of the GPW by mistreating
captured U.S. troops and that there was little reason to suspect that
terrorists would not do the same in the present conflict. 5
Both of these evaluations over simplify the nature of the possible
threat against U.S. forces. A thorough analysis of this threat should
take into account the different natures and missions of U.S. military
forces. At one end of the spectrum are conventional forces, which
operate as part of larger units and under a unified command
structure.1 6 On the other end are the special operations forces that
generally operate in small teams and are specifically designed to take
on unconventional missions."7 It is these unconventional forces that
would be most at risk of being denied POW status. The following
Sections will analyze the possibility of denial of POW status for both
conventional and unconventional U.S. military forces.
B. Effect of the Detainee Designation on Conventional Forces
Regardless of whether a force is conventional or unconventional,
they must both meet the requirements of Article 4 of the GPW to
qualify for POW status. 8 Recall that Article 4(A)(1) mandates
POW status for all captured members of a party's regular armed
forces."9 The GPW's language regarding militia members or other
volunteer combatants is not as sweeping as Article 4(A)(1). Article
4(A)(2) provides four criteria that the captured militia or volunteer
corps member and/or his unit must meet to qualify for POW status.12 °
114. Draft Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to
President George W. Bush 3 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
4999148/site/newsweek/.
115. Id.
116. See U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Forces Command Mission,
http://www.forscom.army.mil/pao/Fact-Sheet/FactSheetFORSCOMMission.pdf (last
visited Dec. 11, 2006) (noting that the U.S. Army active component is composed of
200,000 soldiers spread across three corps and eight divisions).
117. See DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT PUBL'N 3-05, DOCTRINE FOR JOINT SPECIAL
OPERATIONS vii-viii, 111-1 to 111-4 (2003) (discussing the small size, unique missions and
capabilities, and flexible command and control structure of special operations elements).
118. See GPW, supra note 37, art. 4 (noting no distinction in its application to
conventional as opposed to unconventional forces).
119. Id. art. 4(A)(1).
120. See id. art. 4(A)(2); supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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It is unclear from reading the GPW itself whether these four criteria
are limited to Article 4(A)(2) combatants, or whether they apply both
to these individuals and to members of the regular armed forces.
121
This is a significant distinction, as regular armed forces would
technically be able to qualify as POWs even if they conducted their
combat activities in civilian clothing, concealed weapons, and acted
with complete disregard for the law of war, if the four conditions were
deemed not to apply to Article 4(A)(1) forces.
A strict or literal reading of the text indicates that the four
conditions do not apply to Article 4(A)(1). Article 4(A)(1) itself does
not include any limiting criteria; rather, it only states that members of
a party's armed forces and members of militias or volunteer corps
forming such armed forces are entitled to classification as POWs.
122
Furthermore, Article 4(A)(2) only specifies that its four criteria apply
to members of certain militias or volunteer corps and organized
resistance movements. 123 This language does seem to indicate that the
four Article 4(A)(2) conditions are limited to members of other
militias and volunteer corps. Under this strict reading of Article 4,
any service member of the U.S. Armed Forces would be considered a
lawful combatant and subject to POW designation if captured
because he is part of the regular armed forces of the United States.
But most-the author included-consider this reading of the
GPW to be an overly simplistic view of the issue. One commentator
argues at length that the four Article 4(A)(2) conditions apply " 'of
the strictest right or law,' to every unit or group within a state's
regular armed forces as a matter of customary international law."'
124
He further argues that any combatants who do not abide by these
four conditions, regardless of whether they are part of the party's
regular armed forces or members of a militia or volunteer corps, are
acting in an illegal manner and are therefore unlawful combatants. 125
121. See GPW, supra note 37, art. 4(A)(2) (stating no complete list of elements to
which Article 4(A)(2) applies).
122. See id. art. 4(A)(1).
123. Id. art. 4(A)(2). In fact, Article 4(A)(2) mentions these three groups two times, to
the exclusion of any others. Id.
124. Bialke, supra note 99, at 20; see also John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of
Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 207, 219-20 (2004) ("It has long been understood ... that
regular, professional 'armed forces' must comply with the four traditional conditions of
lawful combat under the customary laws of war, and that the terms of articles 4(A)(1) and
(3) of GPW do not abrogate customary law.").
125. Bialke, supra note 99, at 21-23.
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This argument finds support in United States v. Lindh, 6 where
the district court rejected John Walker Lindh's arguments that the
Article 4(A)(2) conditions did not apply to him because he was a
member of a regular armed force. 7 The court responded by stating
that the argument ignored customary practice under the GPW and
that it would lead to an "absurd result" if accepted.' The court went
on to write that
all armed forces or militias, regular and irregular, must meet the
four criteria if their members are to receive combatant
immunity. Were this not so, the anomalous result that would
follow is that members of an armed force that met none of the
criteria could still claim lawful combatant immunity merely on
the basis that the organization calls itself a "regular armed
force."' 29
These statements indicate broad support for the argument that the
Article 4(A)(2) conditions also apply to Article 4(A)(1) regular
forces. Note that this same analysis applies to Article 4(A)(3), which
includes regular armed forces of a government not recognized by the
detaining state. 3 '
Regardless of which of these arguments an individual subscribes
to, the conventional forces of the U.S. military would be protected by
the terms of Article 4 of the GPW. Article 4(A)(1) provides that
members of a combatant country's regular armed forces are to be
considered POWs if captured.' 31  This category would certainly
include the regular armed forces of the United States. But in
accordance with the Lindh holding, such armed forces must also meet
the four criteria set forth in Article 4(A)(2). 32 The conventional
forces of the U.S. military would easily meet these requirements.
Article 4(A)(2)(a) mandates that members of a combatant force
must be commanded by a person responsible for his or her
126. 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
127. See id. at 557 n.35.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. GPW, supra note 37, art. 4(A)(3). The only distinction between Article 4(A)(1)
and 4(A)(3) regular armed forces is that Article 4(A)(1) discusses the regular armed
forces of a party to the conflict, id. art. 4(A)(1), while 4(A)(3) discusses the regular armed
forces of a government not recognized by the detaining state, id. art. 4(A)(3). The
arguments regarding application of the Article 4(A)(2) conditions to regular armed forces
should apply with equal force regardless of whether or not the forces' government is
recognized.
131. Id. art. 4(A)(1).
132. See Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
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subordinates.'33 This criterion essentially requires that the combatant
must be supervised by some type of chain of command. The
hierarchy of U.S. conventional forces illustrates the established and
thorough command structure of the conventional military.1 4  All
service members in the conventional U.S. military have a hierarchical
chain of command that extends from their individual commands to
the chief of their military service and finally to the President of the
United States acting as the Commander in Chief. 35 In short, all U.S.
service members in conventional military units have a hierarchy of
supervisors responsible for their conduct, and therefore all such
conventional service members and their units meet the Article
4(A)(2)(a) criterion.
The second condition under Article 4(A)(2) requires that
military forces must have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance.136 This requirement is designed to ensure that combatant
forces can easily differentiate between belligerents and civilians. 37
Although there is no rule requiring that combatants wear uniforms in
battle, this has been the predominant means by which military
personnel have distinguished themselves from an area's civilian
population.
13 8
The strict uniform requirements for U.S. conventional forces
ensure that U.S. service members easily meet the requirements of this
condition. All U.S. service members in conventional units must wear
standard U.S. military uniforms while on duty, including while
deployed on any expeditionary or combat missions.139 These uniform
133. GPW, supra note 37, art. 4(A)(2)(a).
134. See Dep't of Def., Department of Defense Organization Chart, http://
www.dod.mil/odam/omp/pubs/GuideBook/Pdf/DoD.PDF (last visited Dec. 16, 2006).
135. See id.
136. GPW, supra note 37, art. 4(A)(2)(b).
137. See Parks, supra note 9, at 513-14 ("[M]ilitary forces are obligated to take
reasonable measures to separate themselves from the civilian population and civilian
objects... and to distinguish themselves from the civilian population so as not to place the
civilian population at undue risk. This includes not only physical separation of military
forces.., but also other actions, such as wearing uniforms.").
138. See id. at 515.
139. See DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 36-2903, DRESS AND
PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL (2006), available at http://www.e-
publishing.af.mi/pubfiles/af/36/afi36-2903/afi36-2903.pdf (establishing duty uniform
standards for the U.S. Air Force); DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 670-1,
WEAR AND APPEARANCE OF ARMY UNIFORMS AND INSIGNIA (2005), available at
http://www.apd.army.mi/pdffiles/r670_l.pdf (establishing duty uniform standards for the
U.S. Army); DEP'T OF THE NAVY, NAVPERS 156651, NAVY UNIFORM REGULATIONS
(2005), available at http://buperscd.technology.navy.milbup-updt/upd-CD/BUPERS/
Unireg/tabcon.pdf (establishing duty uniform standards for the U.S. Navy).
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requirements ensure that all U.S. conventional service members will
display a fixed sign recognizable at a distance while deployed (they
will, in fact, be wearing their identifying sign) and that they will be
sufficiently distinguishable from the local civilian population.
Additionally, individual military services can and often do impose
extra requirements that further ensure their solders are readily
identifiable as U.S. military personnel.
140
U.S. conventional forces will also easily meet the third condition,
which requires that combatants openly carry their weapons.4 Part of
a service member's training is to teach him the necessity of always
carrying his assigned weapon. The armed services instruct soldiers,
sailors, and airmen that they are required to openly carry weapons in
law of war training sessions.142 But while it is policy to visibly carry
arms, whether or not a service member does so in a particular
circumstance is a case-by-case issue. A service member who chooses
not to openly carry his weapon will be in violation of Article
4(A)(2)(c) and will therefore be unprotected by the GPW.
The fourth condition is similar to the third with respect to the
case-by-case nature of the determination. Article 4(A)(2)(d) requires
that service members must conduct "their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war. ' 143 Although it is U.S. policy to
adhere to the laws and customs of war,"4 whether or not a service
140. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 670-1, supra note 139, at 240-41
(providing that all members of the U.S. Army must wear a small U.S. flag on their upper
right sleeve at all times, even when not deployed); THIRD U.S. ARMY, ARMY FORCES
CENT. COMMAND (ARCENT), COALITION FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND
(CFLCC), SOLDIER'S STANDARDS BOOK 8 (2006), available at http://
www.arcent.army.mil/images/soldiersstandards/CFLCC_SoldiersStandardsBook_
2006.pdf (stating that all Army personnel in the Iraq and Afghanistan areas must wear a
full-color U.S. flag on their upper right sleeve while deployed in the area).
141. GPW, supra note 37, art. 4(A)(2)(c).
142. See INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.
LEGAL CTR. & SCH., DEP'T OF THE ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 34, 37
(Major Derek I. Grimes et al., eds., 2004) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK],
available at https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-
Public.nsf/0/34e18df949286a4c85256da400507739/Body/M2/OLH2004.pdf?OpenElement
(stating that commanders should brief subordinate commanders and troops on the law of
war provisions regarding weapons).
143. GPW, supra note 37, art. 4(A)(2)(d).
144. See DEP'T OF DEF., DEP'T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE NO. 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR
PROGRAM 2 (Dec. 9, 1998), available at http://justicescholars.org/pegc/archive/DoD/
docslDoDDir 5100.77.pdf ("It is [Department of Defense] policy to ensure that ... law
of war obligations of the United States are observed and enforced by the [Department of
Defense] Components."); JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF INSTRUCTION 5810.01B, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOD LAW OF WAR
PROGRAM 1-2 (Mar. 25, 2002), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs-directives/cdata/
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member does so in a particular situation is a case-by-case analysis.
Although military training and policy dictate that all service members
must abide by this GPW requirement, if an individual chooses to
commit a war crime, he would no longer meet the requirements of the
four Article 4(A)(2) criteria and would therefore not be entitled to
POW status if captured.
The foregoing analysis indicates that U.S. service members in
conventional military units should easily qualify as POWs pursuant to
the GPW if captured in the course of an international armed conflict
as long as they adhere to U.S. military training and policy directives.
However, if the individual does not comply with any of the four
Article 4(A)(2) criteria at the time of capture, he would not be
entitled to POW status pursuant to the GPW.
C. Effect of the Detainee Designation on Special Operations Forces
Although conventional forces are not at a significant risk of
being designated as anything other than POWs if captured by enemy
forces, the same cannot easily be said regarding special operations
forces ("SOF"). A special operations unit is an inherently
unconventional military unit, and the analysis as to whether the GPW
applies to SOF is therefore more complicated. The Department of
Defense defines special operations as "[olperations conducted in
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve
military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives
employing military capabilities for which there is no broad
conventional force requirement." 145  Special operations are
distinguishable from conventional military operations by "degree of
physical and political risk, operational techniques, and mode of
employment among other factors. [Department of Defense] special
operations are frequently clandestine-designed in such a way as to
unlimit/5810_01.pdf ("The Armed Forces of the United States will comply with the law of
war during all armed conflicts .... The law of war obligations of the US Government are
observed and enforced by the US Armed Forces."); see also id. at A-2 to A-4 (stating that
commanders in the U.S. Armed Forces must ensure that their personnel receive
appropriate law of war training, and that law of war scenarios are included in unit training
exercises); DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 350-1, ARMY TRAINING AND
LEADER DEVELOPMENT 113 (2006), available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/
r350_l.pdf (stating that all members of the U.S. Army are required to undergo training in
the law of war prior to any deployment).
145. DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT PUBL'N 1-02, supra note 9, at 499.
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ensure concealment." '146 These definitions indicate that SOF operates
in a less clearly defined environment than conventional forces, and
that they must therefore behave in a manner befitting their
unconventional mission. It is this behavior that puts the SOF
elements at greater risk when they are captured by their adversaries.
SOF conduct during OEF illustrates their unconventional
behavior. Perhaps the most visibly unconventional aspect of SOF
behavior, and the most problematic under the GPW, was SOF wear
of nonstandard uniforms in the early stages of the conflict. News
reports featured images of "forward-operating SOF on horseback,
bearded, robed and turbaned to blend in with local 'friendlies,' using
state-of-the-art technology-laser designators, laptop computers,
satellite dishes, [ultra-high frequency] radios, sophisticated navigation
equipment-to guide devastating airstrikes on Taliban positions." '47
During the early phases of OEF, SOF worked extensively with
Afghan resistance groups, especially the Northern Alliance, which
insisted that U.S. SOF elements don the customary attire of their
group.148 This attire included the Massoud pakol (a round tan or gray
wool cap) and the Massoud checkered scarf; it specifically did not
include the U.S. desert camouflage uniform worn by all U.S. service
members deployed to a desert environment.149
It is this type of behavior by SOF elements that make them
particularly vulnerable to arguments that they should not be classified
as POWs in accordance with the GPW. One military judge advocate
general has recognized four possibilities as to the classification of
SOF operators. 5 ° The first is that of a lawful combatant, who would
be entitled to POW status if captured. 5' The second possible status is
that of a common criminal, who would be subject to the internal laws
146. RICHARD A. BEST, JR. & ANDREW FEICKERT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No.
RS22017, SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF) AND CIA PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS:
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS22017.pdf.
147. Grant McLoone, Sledgehammers, Scalpels and Software: Special Operations and
the Law of War in the 21st Century, 12 U.S.A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 139 (2002-
03).
148. See Parks, supra note 9, at 496-97 (describing the integration of U.S. special
operations service members into the ranks of the Northern Alliance).
149. See id. These items were named after Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the
Northern Alliance who was killed by al Qaeda operatives just days before September 11,
2001. See id. at 497.
150. See McLoone, supra note 147, at 148-50.
151. Id. at 148. If classified as a lawful combatant, an individual would be entitled to
combatant immunity, which would protect him from punishment for his belligerent actions
before capture. See id. at 148-49.
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of the detaining state. 5 ' The detaining state could then treat the
captured service member as a foreign citizen caught committing a
crime, and would therefore be able to prosecute the service member
for treason, sedition, sabotage, plotting to overthrow the government,
and other crimes that could possibly be punishable by death.153 The
third possible status that a detaining state could give a captured SOF
operator is that of a spy. 54 A spy would be considered a legal
combatant, but he would also be subject to trial and possible
execution pursuant to the capturing country's laws.'55 The captured
service member would probably only receive the same due process
protections afforded to common criminals in the capturing country. 56
The final and least favorable status that could be afforded to captured
SOF operators is that of unlawful combatant.'57
Determining which category the SOF personnel would fall under
requires an analysis of the Article 4 requirements of the GPW. Even
though SOF elements are members of the regular armed forces of the
United States,'58 they still must meet the four conditions listed under
Article 4(A)(2). 59 As a group, the only condition that would be
problematic for SOF elements is the Article 4(A)(2)(b) distinctive
sign requirement. The remaining criteria are satisfied for reasons
similar to those for conventional military elements. Article
4(A)(2)(a), which requires "being commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates,"'' is established by the command
structure that exists for SOF and all other U.S. military forces.'
6'
Articles 4(A)(2)(c) and (d), which require that combatants carry arms
openly162 and conduct operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war,163 respectively, are also subject to the same analysis as
conventional U.S. military forces. Military training and common






158. See Dep't of Def., Department of Defense Organization Chart, supra note 134
(showing that the Special Operations Command is part of the regular U.S. military
hierarchy).
159. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text (establishing that it is common
understanding that the four Article 4(A)(2) conditions apply equally to Article 4(A)(1)
regular armed forces).
160. GPW, supra note 37, art. 4(A)(2)(a).
161. See Dep't of Def., Department of Defense Organization Chart, supra note 134
(noting that Special Operations Command falls within the U.S. military hierarchy).
162. GPW, supra note 37, art. 4(A)(2)(c).
163. Id. art. 4(A)(2)(d).
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practice dictate that U.S. forces, including SOF, must carry their
weapons openly." Furthermore, U.S. military policy is to always
abide by the laws and customs of war.165 All U.S. service members,
including those in the special operations community, are trained to
abide by military regulations and policies governing the laws of war
and armed conflict.'66 Therefore, SOF elements as a whole do meet
the Article 4(A)(2)(c) and (d) conditions. 167
This leaves only the Article 4(A)(2)(b) condition of "having a
fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.' ' 168  Of the four
Article 4(A)(2) criteria, this is the one in which SOF behavior differs
most from standard military practice. The wearing of nonstandard
uniforms in the early parts of OEF169 is the type of behavior that puts
SOF elements at risk of running afoul of this condition. Considering
the SOF mission and emphasis on building strong relations with
indigenous forces, 7' it is likely that this behavior will continue to be a
problem in future conflicts. This behavior is problematic because the
law of war considers the uniform to be the primary manner by which
lawful military combatants engaged in an international armed conflict
distinguish themselves from the local civilian population. 7'
Although this seems to indicate that standard uniforms are
required to designate a party as a combatant, there is no rule
requiring that combatants wear a complete, standard uniform to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population. 7 2  Indeed, the
164. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 142, at 34, 37 (stating that
service members, including SOF, should be trained to carry their weapons openly in their
law of war classes).
165. See DEP'T OF DEF., DEP'T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE No. 5100.77, supra note 144, at 2
(noting that it is Department of Defense policy to ensure that U.S. Armed Forces observe
and enforce the law of war).
166. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (describing the Department of
Defense's emphasis on training individual service members on the United States' law of
war obligations).
167. But note that an individual service member who chooses not to carry his weapon
openly or who in some way violates the laws or customs of war would not individually
meet the Article 4(A)(2)(c) or (d) conditions and would consequently not qualify for
POW status.
168. GPW, supra note 37, art. 4(A)(2)(b).
169. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
170. See DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT PUBL'N 3-05, supra note 117, at 11-7 to 11-8 (discussing
SOF elements' close working relationship with host nation or indigenous forces in
missions where SOF supports foreign internal defense and during unconventional
warfare). "[SOF units] advise, train, and assist indigenous resistance movements already
in existence to conduct [unconventional warfare] and when required, accompany them
into combat." Id. at 11-8.
171. Parks, supra note 9, at 541.
172. Id. at 516.
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Red Cross commentary to the diplomatic conference that developed
Additional Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions 173 stated that any
customary uniform that distinguished the combatant from nearby
noncombatants would be sufficient. 174 These statements indicate that
"any device recognizable in daylight with unenhanced vision at a
reasonable distance would meet the law of war obligation to be
distinguishable from the civilian population. ' 175 This distinguishing
item could include common items such as a hat, scarf, or armband
that have a distinctive meaning in the area of the conflict.
176
SOF members went to great effort to blend in with their
Northern Alliance and other indigenous allies, rather than with the
civilian population. 177 For example, SOF elements operating with the
Northern Alliance wore the distinctive Massoud pakol and scarf to
identify themselves as part of the Northern Alliance forces they
accompanied. 78 This would not be problematic because reports
indicated that al Qaeda and Taliban forces could easily distinguish the
Northern Alliance troops from the local civilian populations. 179 As
long as the SOF elements effectively distinguished themselves from
the civilian population, they would easily meet the requirements of
Article 4(a)(2)(b). Proper identification as combatants rather than
the wearing of a complete uniform is, after all, the primary concern of
this criterion.
There were several valid justifications for the SOF efforts to try
to blend in with their indigenous allies. Perhaps the most important
was simply to lower the profile of the SOF operators.18' Al Qaeda
and the Taliban had announced a $25,000 bounty for each uniformed
U.S. service member operating in Afghanistan.'81 Considering this
bounty, placing uniformed SOF operators in the midst of the
Northern Alliance ranks would have greatly increased their visibility
and would therefore constitute an undue risk that they would be
173. Note that the United States is not a party to Additional Protocol I, but the
background of Additional Protocol I is still relevant to the definition of what constitutes a
proper fixed sign as required by Article 4(A)(2)(b) of the GPW.
174. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 468
(Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987).
175. Parks, supra note 9, at 517.
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
178. See Parks, supra note 9, at 496-97.
179. See id. at 498.




disproportionately targeted. 82 This was an especially significant risk
for SOF elements because they operate in such small numbers.'83
Another justification for the wearing of the nonstandard
uniforms was to gain the trust of Afghan militia allies, some of whom
specifically requested that the SOF elements attached to their forces
don the traditional dress of their organizations."84 Regardless of
which of these was the prevalent motivation, the record indicates that
SOF elements' primary concern was blending in with their Afghan
allies, rather than the Afghan civilian population. These personnel
were merely exchanging their own combatant uniforms for those of
their allies. Such wear of the nonstandard uniform of an ally would
not be a violation of Article 4(A)(2)(b) because the SOF member
wearing the uniform would still be showing a fixed distinctive sign
that distinguished him from the local civilian population.
8 1
The preceding analysis indicates that there is no legitimate
argument that the Bush administration's justifications for designating
detainees as enemy combatants can be used against elements of the
U.S. military in future conflicts. There is simply no basis in Article 4
for an enemy to conclude that the GPW does not apply to a captured
U.S. service member unless that service member has somehow
individually violated one of the Article 4(A)(2) conditions.
8 6
Unfortunately, many potential enemies likely would not let this fact
interfere with their desire to mistreat captured U.S. service members.
CONCLUSION
Although there is little legal justification to support a claim that
captured U.S. service members be designated anything other than
POWs, the United States should do all it can to ensure that such a
claim is never justifiable. An easy first step would be to mandate the
182. See id.
183. See DEP'TOF DEF., JOINT PUBL'N 3-05,supra note 117, at 1-2.
184. See Parks, supra note 9, at 497 n.7. U.S. Army Special Forces wore Northern
Alliance attire at the request of Northern Alliance General Abdul Rashid Dostum. See id.
185. There are other aspects of SOF behavior that would likely make them
recognizable as combatants. The mere fact that a person carries U.S. military weaponry
would likely serve as a sufficient signal. This is especially the case in countries like
Afghanistan, where the enemy is very likely to know the types of weapons that are
prevalent in the area and would therefore readily recognize the weaponry of a foreign
military. The fact that these same soldiers are carrying high-technology radios, laptop
computers, laser designators, and other such equipment, would further serve to distinguish
the U.S. SOF elements from ordinary civilians.
186. For example, a U.S. soldier who decided to put on civilian clothes, sneak behind
enemy lines with concealed explosives, and detonate a bomb in a church, would not be
protected merely because his unit as a whole has met the Article 4 requirements.
2007] 665
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
wearing of a small U.S. flag, visibly affixed to the uniform of all U.S.
service members at all times while on a combat deployment. This
requirement would apply to both conventional and SOF elements.
The Article 4(A)(2)(b) display of a fixed symbol requirement seems
to be the criterion that would be most problematic for certain service
members and units, particularly the SOF forces. Requiring the
attachment of a small U.S. flag on whatever type of uniform the
individual combatant is wearing would preclude any capturing party
from legitimately claiming that a captured U.S. service member
should not be treated as a POW because of a violation of the fixed
symbol criterion.
In addition, the U.S. military should strive to ensure that all
members of the armed forces, as individuals, understand and abide by
the last three conditions listed in Article 4(A)(2). Note that as
Article 4(A)(2)(a) merely requires a defined chain of command for
each service member, which is not within the control of the individual
combatant, there is no pressing need to ensure that service members
understand this requirement. The final three criteria, however, are
within the individual service member's control. Although U.S.
service members are already trained in the law of war, including the
Article 4(A)(2) criteria, both on a regular basis and prior to any
deployment,187 the military should strive to ensure that all soldiers,
sailors, and airmen understand the repercussions of failing to abide by
these criteria. Additionally, senior leaders should ensure that junior
officers and noncommissioned officers vigilantly enforce the
requirements of Article 4(A)(2)(b)-(d) on the ground. A violation of
any of these conditions by an individual service member could
potentially strip that soldier of his POW protections if captured.
A potentially more difficult step would be to review the decision
to designate some of the detainees captured in Afghanistan and Iraq
as enemy combatants, or at least give these detainees the proper
means to challenge the basis of their detention. The analysis in Part
IV of this Comment establishes that U.S. service members captured
during an international armed conflict should be entitled to POW
status as long as they abide by accepted military regulations and
practices; 88 therefore, the Bush administration's justifications for its
enemy combatant policy will not place U.S. personnel at any
legitimate legal risk. But the mere fact that the administration's
decision to deny POW status to al Qaeda and Taliban detainees is not
187. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
188. See supra Part IV.
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legally risky does not make it a wise or proper thing to do. The
administration's decision could possibly give future adversaries some
precedent to support their decisions to deny POW protections to
captured U.S. service members in murky situations.
In this context, the administration's decision could be dangerous
in practice for captured U.S. service members in several different
situations. For example, the United States would now have a
significantly more difficult task arguing that a captured service
member who was not adhering to the Article 4(A)(2) requirements
should nonetheless receive the protections given to a POW. An
enemy state would likely be less willing to make such a concession in
light of a U.S. policy that refuses to make any concessions in the
designation of individual Guantanamo detainees. Another situation
where the enemy combatant policy could be harmful is one in which
the applicability of the GPW to a particular individual or group of
individuals is a very close call. In such a situation, the enemy state
might be reluctant to err on the side of caution and afford the
captured individuals POW status in light of the administration's
conduct. Finally, in a conflict involving the United States that does
not actually rise to the level of an international armed conflict
between parties to the Geneva Conventions and therefore does not
trigger application of the GPW,189 the United States would no longer
be able to strongly argue that captured service members should be
afforded POW status merely because it is the "right" or accepted
thing to do. These are apparently concerns that former Secretary of
State Powell also considered. In advocating application of the GPW
to the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban, he wrote that such a
determination "presents a positive international posture, preserves
U.S. credibility and moral authority by taking the high ground, and
puts us in a better position to demand and receive international
support."1 90
Another problem with the present policy is that future
adversaries could point to the Bush administration's reluctance to
give Guantanamo detainees a reasonable degree of due process to
challenge their enemy combatant classification and their continued
detention' 91 In much the same way, an adversary could classify a
captured U.S. service member-who actually has abided by the
requirements of the GPW-as an enemy combatant, and
189. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
190. Powell Memorandum, supra note 30, at 3 (emphasis added).
191. See supra Part II.B (discussing Supreme Court rulings in detainees' attempts to
secure due process for their claims of improper classification as enemy combatants).
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subsequently refuse to provide that service member with any
reasonable basis to challenge the grounds of the classification. In
response to U.S. protests, the detaining party could merely point to
the fact that the Bush administration itself was reluctant to give
detainees a means to challenge the basis of their detention. In short,
the classification process and the administration's defense of the
process set a bad example from a country that has always prided itself
on strict adherence to, and respect for, the laws of war.
Although it would be inadvisable to classify al Qaeda terrorists
as POWs, granting POW status to Taliban detainees who have no
association with terrorist activity may be a good way to gain some
goodwill in the international community and among potential future
adversaries. At the least, it would set a more positive precedent. By
setting an example of erring on the side of greater protections for
nonterrorist detainees, the United States could potentially strengthen
its moral claim that all captured U.S. service members should be
classified as POWs. Although this would do little to help U.S. service
members captured by terrorists or other individuals who regularly
disregard the law of war, it may help those service members captured
by the armed forces of somewhat more reputable countries.
The issues raised in this Comment will likely recur. Al Qaeda
and similar groups continue to exist and are probably plotting more
attacks against the United States. Combating such an irregular force
requires flexibility and versatility from the U.S. Armed Forces. These
forces must constantly adapt their behavior and tactics to effectively
counter their enemies. But in adapting to fight these groups in their
type of battle and on their terrain, these forces must ensure that they
individually continue to retain their identity as combatant U.S.
service members by adhering to the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions. The Geneva Conventions will protect them if captured,
but only if they abide by its stipulated conditions.
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